Transfer of single farm payment entitlements to farm successors: impact on structural change and rental prices in Switzerland by Mack, Gabriele et al.
ISSN 2280-6180 (print) © Firenze University Press 
ISSN 2280-6172 (online) www.fupress.com/bae
Bio-based and Applied Economics 2(2): 113-130, 2013
Transfer of single farm payment entitlements to farm 
successors: impact on structural change and rental prices in 
Switzerland
Gabriele Mack1, anke MöhrinG, ali Ferjani, albert ZiMMerMann, SteFan Mann 
Agroscope Reckenholz-Tänikon (ART), Socioeconomics Research Group, 8356 Ettenhausen, Switzerland
Abstract. This paper analyses the impact of tradable and non-tradable single farm 
payment (SFP) entitlements for farm successors on structural change and the lease 
market. Using the example of Swiss agriculture, the effects on rental-price trends and 
farm-exit rates are investigated. An ex-ante normative impact analysis is performed 
with the agent-based agricultural-sector model SWISSland, which simulates struc-
tural change processes and income trends in Swiss agriculture over a period of up to 
15 years. A land market implemented at municipality level simulates the plot-by-plot 
leasing of land to surrounding neighbouring agents that is common in Switzerland. 
Allocation of plots to tenants as well as lease pricing is modelled taking into account 
the farm-specific land rents. The results show that personalised SFP entitlements 
which could not be transferred to a farm successor not only cause an intensification of 
structural change, but would also thus lead to a substantial reduction in rental prices. 
SFP entitlements which were successfully transferred to farm successors have only a 
slight impact on structural change and the rental prices of arable land. Only for grass-
land in the mountain region does a stronger shift result in a significant reduction in 
rental prices. 
Keywords. rental market, agent-based modelling, agricultural sector model, struc-
tural change, single farm payments, farm succession.
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1. Introduction
The introduction of single farm payments (SFP) is an integral part of the agricultural 
policy reform planned by the Swiss government from 2014 onwards. Before the reform, 
direct payments in Switzerland were primarily based on agricultural area and livestock 
units. Now, after the introduction of the reform, payments based on livestock units have 
been substantially reduced, and are disbursed exclusively for animal-friendly housing sys-
tems. Single area payments (SAP) and SFP will be the most important payment schemes 
from 2014 onwards. To ensure that agricultural policy and the direct-payment system are 
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as effective and efficient as possible, concrete aims that bear close scrutiny are set out in 
the Federal Council’s Message on Agricultural Policy for 2014-17 (AP 14-17). SAP are 
spent to ensure the provision of adequate supplies of high-quality food and to preserve 
the natural heritage, the environment and biodiversity. 
The introduction of SFP in 2014 was completely new in the almost-20-year history 
of the Swiss direct-payment system. Entitlements for SFP are farm-specific, and the pay-
ments amount to the total support received by the farm in the period prior to the reform 
in order to ensure a socially acceptable level of income after the reform. During the con-
sultation period which marks the beginning of every policy-reform process in Switzer-
land, policy-makers intended to couple SFP entitlements to the cultivation of the farm 
and to the person managing the farm in the first year after the reform, while the transfer 
of SFP entitlements from this person to his farm successor was not planned. The aim of 
fully decoupling SFP from production factors was to increase land mobility and to lower 
rental prices in Switzerland (BLW, 2011). The consultation period resulted in the policy 
decision to enable the transfer of SFP entitlements to farm successors (Bundesrat, 2012). It 
was also decided to shift SFP to SAP within a period of eight years. 
A large number of studies have examined the distributional effects of a shift from 
SAP to SFP in the EU from both a static and a dynamic perspective (Happe and Balmann, 
2002; Kilian and Salhofer, 2008; Kilian et al., 2012; Ciaian and Kancs, 2012). The dynam-
ic perspective takes into account the fact that subsidy payments may induce structural 
changes in the economy, such as productivity growth and exit/entry of farms. These struc-
tural changes may in turn affect the distributional effects of subsidies.
Happe and Balmann (2002) have shown for the Hohenlohe region in Baden-Würt-
temberg that more frequent farm exits and falling rental prices are especially to be expect-
ed when farm payments are completely decoupled – i.e. when they impose no obligations 
on the recipients and allow for the possibility of continuing to receive the direct payments 
even in the case of farm exit. Ciaian et al. (2008) have demonstrated theoretically that in 
the case of inelastic land supply, area payments may be capitalised into land values, ben-
efiting landowners instead of farmers. Based on a partial equilibrium model, Ciaian and 
Kancs (2012) have shown that the capitalisation of SAP into land rents is increasing. By 
applying a general equilibrium model, Ciaian et al. (2008) discovered that from a static 
perspective, i.e. without considering structural change, the SFP only benefits farmers. In 
a dynamic world, effects depend upon the nature of structural change, as well as on the 
tradability of entitlements. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of transferring SFP entitlements to farm 
successors on the latters’ farm-take over decisions, on structural change, and on rental 
prices in Switzerland. The paper then goes on to present the impact on structural change 
and rental prices of a shift from SFP to SAP.
In this study, a normative impact analysis is performed with the agent-based agri-
cultural sector model SWISSland, which simulates the structural-change processes and 
income trends in Swiss agriculture over a maximum period of 15 years. The study describes 
in detail the municipal scale of SWISSland, and the modelling of both the rental-market 
decisions taking place at the municipal level, and of rental pricing. It focuses primarily on 
the methods for specifying the FADN-based agents in terms of geo-referenced attributes in 
the initial year, as well as illustrating the modelling of farm-succession decisions.
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Chapter 2 gives an overview of the agent-based sector model SWISSland, introduc-
es the database, and describes the spatial structures and modelling of the rental market. 
Chapter 3 outlines the model scenarios and describes the results. Chapter 4 contains a dis-
cussion of the results.
2. Methods
2.1 Overview of the agent-based sector model SWISSland 
The agent-based sector model SWISSland simulates structural-change processes and 
income trends for Swiss agriculture. It also explicitly models farm-takeover decisions by 
young successors, and the transfer of SFP entitlements to these successors. The agent pop-
ulation of the sector model is based on the 3,400 FADN farms which provide their book-
keeping data to Agroscope Reckenholz-Tänikon ART’s Farm Accountancy Data Network. 
These FADN farms represent a sample of the approximately 55,000 Swiss farms operating 
in 2006-2008. Geographically, the 3,400 FADN farms are spread throughout Switzerland. 
Because, however, a spatially realistic local structure is necessary for simulating land trade 
among agents, a spatial reference on the municipal scale was implemented in the sector 
model. Figure 1 gives an overview of the data sources, as well as specifying the agents’ 
attributes in the initial year and the agent’s behaviour. 
The selection of all 3,400 FADN farms as agents ensures detailed individual farm 
records for modelling the agents’ production resources. A study by Moehring et al. (2010) 
describes the agents’ attributes in great detail in terms of production resources and bio-
graphical attributes. In Moehring et al. (2011), detailed explanations are given for the 
modelling of production and investment decisions based on individual-farm optimisation 
models, as well as for the modelling of farm exit and handover decisions. In Zimmermann 
et al., 2011 model results are shown.
Because only about 0.2% of the entire utilised agricultural area in Switzerland chang-
es owner each year (Giuliani, 2002), whilst the majority of the land provided by exiting 
farms is rented, land-purchase decisions are not modelled in SWISSland.
2.2 Defining neighbourly relationships for FADN-based agents 
The 3,400 FADN-based agents are located throughout Switzerland, and do not usu-
ally have a neighbourly relationship with each other. To model land trade among these 
FADN-based agents, a spatially realistic municipality structure including neighbourhood 
patterns among farm locations was implemented in the sector model. The municipality 
structure is based on seven existing Swiss municipalities. The seven reference municipali-
ties were chosen from among Switzerland’s 2,765 municipalities in a two-step procedure. 
Firstly, a municipal typology was created on the basis of size (utilised agricultural area or 
UAA), difference in altitude (between the lowest and highest point above sea level of the 
UAA), and distribution of the farmland over different altitude levels within a municipal-
ity. These attributes were selected because they determine the accessibility and the driving 
time between the farm locations and the plots of a municipality. The horizontal and ver-
tical distances between the farm locations and the plots were estimated for Switzerland’s 
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2,765 municipalities. On this basis, five municipality groups were selected to which all of 
Switzerland’s 2,765 municipalities were assigned (Table 1). Secondly, taking the represent-
ativeness of farm type and size into account, at least one genuinely existing municipal-
Figure 1. Schematic model overview of the agent-based sector model SWISSland.
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ity per group was chosen, and specific geo-referenced data (topology of the plots culti-
vated on each farm, location of the farm buildings) were determined for each farm in the 
municipality. Data were processed in a GIS in order to generate information on distances 
from farm buildings to plots, as well as on neighbourhoods, plot size, and form of culti-
vation. The main selection criterion for the reference municipalities was the availability 
of geo-referenced data for all farm locations and fields within the municipality (Table 2). 
The farms located in the reference municipalities served as a source of information for the 
description of the FADN-based agents in terms of spatial and topographic characteristics.












Standard Deviation of 
Difference in Altitude
(m)
1 1,016 316 301 90 54
2 571 411 273 231 132
3 480 614 627 372 131
4 350 1,125 928 1,421 389
5 334 1,223 1,565 1,381 377
UAA: Utilised Agricultural Area. 
Source: Own calculations.














No. of Farms 
per Reference  
Municipality




Oberembrach 1 591 394 202 31 9
Illnau-
Effretikon 2 1,158 735 197 54 7
Vechigen 3 1,467 799 396 102 7
Trimmis 4 479 995 1,961 49 14
Alpnach 5 922 729 1,551 78 7
Engelberg 5 722 483 1,823 58 8
Giswil 5 1,181 1,076 1,727 109 7
Source: Own calculations.
To model land trade among the FADN-based agents, each agent was assigned to a 
matching farm location in a reference municipality (Figure 2). 
The principal criteria for the assignment of FADN-based agents to farm locations of 
the reference municipalities were matching attributes which were present in both datasets, 
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particularly farm area (ha UAA, ha grassland, ha arable land), altitude (m.a.s.l.) and the 
zones to which they belonged (lowland zone to mountain zone 4). Because the number 
of FADN-based agents was significantly higher than the number of farm locations in the 
reference municipalities, our first step was to duplicate the reference municipalities which 
were underrepresented in terms of these allocation features. This was done by minimising 
the sum of the squared deviations between the attributes of the FADN-based agents and 
the farms locations of the reference municipalities. Because over half of all FADN-based 
agents had farm locations in a reference municipality of group 5, taking one reference 
municipality for group 5 into account would require approx. 20 duplications per munici-
pality. In order to limit the number of duplications per municipality, it was decided to 
take three genuinely existing municipalities into account for group 5. The duplication pro-
cedure led to the total number of 59 SWISSland municipalities (last column of Table 2).
An advantage of this method is that it allows the topology and the distances between 
plots to be modelled highly realistically, even though it is difficult to ensure the represent-
ativeness of all features (topography, UAA per municipality, farm type, zone). The 3,400 
FADN-based agents were assigned to the actual farms of the SWISSland municipalities 
by minimising the sum of the squared deviations of these attributes between the FADN-
based agents and the actual farm in each case. The allocation of agents to the 59 munici-
palities could in turn be formulated as an optimisation problem. The binary solution vari-
Figure 2. Assignment of FADN-based agents to farms in reference municipalities to model land trade.
Reference municipalities with genuine farm 
locations and genuine land trade
FADN-based agents throughout Switzerland: 
No land trade among FADN-based agents
Assignment of FADN-based agents to farm 
locations in the reference municipalities to model  
land trade, taking into account the neighbourhood 
relationships of these agents
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able of such a system would, however, be a matrix in the ‘No. of agents  *  No. of farms 
in the reference municipalities’ dimension, which would overtax the available solution 
capacities. Assignment is therefore via a gradual loop formulation in which each agent 
is successively assigned to the most suitable farm in the reference municipalities in each 
case that is not yet taken. The most suitable farm in each case is the one with the smallest 
deviations in its attributes. In the event of unequal size representations of the attributes, 
this process could result in no suitable actual farm in the reference municipalities still 
being available for the last agents to be allocated. Because of this, the attributes of both the 
agents and the farms of the reference municipalities are transformed beforehand into rank 
values. In this way, and because it leaves several farms of the reference municipalities still 
available to the last agent to be allocated, an adequate distribution result is achieved. 
Because the most important criterion for the assignment of the FADN-based agents 
to the farms of the SWISSland municipalities was the matching of the attribute ‘farm area’, 
differences in farm size between the agents and the farms of the reference municipalities 
were very small. Where minor differences existed, reference-municipality farm plots were 
uniformly scaled up or down so that farm area corresponded exactly to that of the rel-
evant FADN-based agents. In addition, several other FADN-based agent attributes (e.g. 
percentage of arable land; percentage of slopes and steep land) were transferred to the 
allocated plot structures.
Consequently, all FADN-based agents are determined by spatial characteristics (farm-
yard coordinates; number of plots with meadows and arable land; coordinates of the plots 
and their field-farmyard distance), and ultimately possess ‘virtual’ neighbouring agents 
whose plots border on other agents. 
2.3 Modelling farm-takeover decisions
In Switzerland, farming exit is shaped primarily by the farm manager’s life cycle. Nor-
mally, once the farm manager turns 65 and starts receiving his state pension – coinciding 
with the lapse of entitlement to direct payments – the farm either closes down and the 
land is put up for lease, or the farm’s production resources (i.e. land and capital resources) 
are transferred in their entirety to a family successor (Meier et al., 2009). Under the pre-
sent framework conditions, farms are only very seldom given up before pensionable age is 
reached (Rossier and Wyss, 2006). Furthermore, fewer than 10% of Swiss farm managers 
are older than the statutory retirement age of 65. In an empirical study, Rossier and Wyss 
(2006) discovered that in Switzerland, farm-succession decisions are significantly influ-
enced by number of sons in the family, location of the farm (lowland, hill or mountain 
region), size and type of the farm, receipt of direct payments, and farm income. 
In the agent-based model SWISSland, these findings on the determinants of farm 
transfer are implemented in a two-stage decision-making process. In a first step, agents 
with sons determine their potential successors. If an agent has no son, the farmland is 
put up for lease. In a second step, an income criterion for the takeover decision by the 
‘successive agent’, to the effect that the attainable household income of the farm must be 
higher than an exogenously determined minimum household income, is implemented in 
the model. This minimum income is based on an average reference income for the second 
and third sector in Switzerland. Takeover of the farm’s production resources (land and 
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capital resources) by the ‘successive agent’ occurs only when this income criterion is met. 
Farm succession and farm exit are therefore determined both by the rate at which agents 
reach pensionable age, and by the percentage of successful takeovers, which is in turn 
dependent on income trends. In the subsequent years of the farm succession, land-leasing 
options and investment options in animal- housing systems are modelled. 
2.4 Underlying data for modelling the land market
The individual farm records (2006-2008 three-year average) of 3,400 currently operat-
ing FADN family farms provided a detailed factual basis for modelling the agents’ produc-
tion resources (land use, livestock, family and non-family labour, financial values), pro-
duction costs, prices and direct payments. Land-ownership data was used to define the 
total area of both owned and rented land (Table 3). 
Table 3. Area of owned and rented farmland in the plain, hill and mountain regions.
Plain region Hill region Mountain region
FADN Farms No. 1,420 980 994





Total land ha 20.06 10.96 17.24 10.24 17.92 11.36
Owned land ha 11.30 7.02 10.57 6.90 10.80 8.57
Rented land ha 8.76 9.59 6.66 8.80 6.90 9.74
Source: Calculated on the basis of Agroscope Reckenholz-Tänikon ART’s Farm Accountancy Data Net-
work (FADN) data pool (ART, 2006-2008).
In the absence of a nationwide Swiss statistical survey on grassland and arable-land 
rental prices, the FADN sample of specialised arable and grassland farms was used to pro-
vide a rough estimate of the lease prices for grassland and arable land in the plain, hill 
and mountain regions of Switzerland (Table 4). The compulsory upper limits of the lease 
prices depend on the productive value of the land, determined on a regular basis by the 
Swiss cantonal authorities. 
2.5 Modelling Land Exchange and Lease Pricing
A precondition for land trade among agents is a neighbourly relationship. Because 
such a relationship derives from farm locations within a municipality, land-trade mod-
elling is limited to agents whose farm locations are in the same municipality. SWISS-
land models a plot-by-plot land lease from ‘exiting agents’ to the remaining agents in 
the immediate vicinity. The ‘exiting agents’ are those having no farm successor to whom 
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they can hand over, or those whose potential successor decides against taking over the 
farm on economic grounds (see Section 2.3). The agents in the near vicinity of an exiting 
agent form the group of agents interested in the latter’s plots. Decisions to allocate land 
to the neighbouring agents as well as lease pricing are modelled as a plot-by-plot bidding 
process. The initial lease price asked by an exiting agent is based on the average regional 
values of the FADN farms for arable land and grassland in the base year (see Table 4). 
Because these regional averages are close to the compulsory upper limits for rental prices 
that are measured against the productive value of the land, these values are also taken as 
upper limits for regional lease prices.
An agent’s lease decision for a plot depends on its income growth. As the supply of 
plots rises, other production resources such as labour generally exert a limiting effect, caus-
ing the plot-based economic benefit to decline. To calculate the increase in income of all 
neighbouring agents involved in the bidding process, each of these agents is optimised with 
the new plot. The neighbouring agent receives the plot which generates the highest profit 
at the upper limit of the lease price. If, however, the upper limit of the lease price is higher 
than the increase in income of all agents in the near vicinity, the bidding process is repeat-
ed, taking other agents in the wider vicinity into account. Where the upper limit of the 
lease price is also too high for agents in the wider vicinity, it is assumed that the exiting 
agent will reduce the lease price in steps and that the bidding process will recommence. 
Should the situation arise where the lease price is greater than zero and no neighbouring 
agent is able to generate a profit for a plot, the plot becomes fallow land. Provided that a 
neighbouring agent benefits from leasing only when the lease price is zero, it is assumed 
that the exiting agent leaves the neighbouring agent the plot before it becomes fallow land. 
Empirical studies conducted in two regions of Germany (Strom, 1998) show that 
the number of farms involved in the lease market is limited, ranging between one and 
five farms. Based on the findings of Strohm (1998), it was assumed that the five nearest 
neighbours were involved in the bidding process. Only in the event that no agent could be 
found were three further neighbours considered. These restrictions on the number of bid-
ding agents in the same municipality limit the number of optimisation runs to an accept-
able range. A stepwise 20% reduction in lease prices was also stipulated in order to limit 
the number of optimisation runs. 
Table 4. 2006-2008 three-year-average lease prices (CHF/ha) for arable land and grassland in the Swiss 
plain, hill and mountain regions.
Region Plain Hill Mountain
Arable land 
Average for 2006-20081) 745 690 527
Standard deviation1) 301 327 135
Grassland
Average for 2006-20081) 629 516 420
Standard deviation1) 190 215 230
Calculated on the basis of the sample of specialised arable and grassland farms from Agroscope Reck-
enholz-Tänikon ART’s Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) data pool (ART, 2006-2008).
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3. Scenario definitions and results
The first scenario assumes that SFP are transferable from the exiting agent to the suc-
cessor agent in the subsequent years of the reform. This scenario is hereinafter referred 
to as ‘Transferable SFP’. The second scenario implies that SFP could not be transferred to 
a successor agent after the reform. This is thought to negatively influence the successor 
agent’s decision regarding takeover, as well as to enhance structural change. Scenario 2 is 
hereinafter referred to as ‘Non-Transferable SFP’. In both scenarios, all output and input 
prices except those for land are constant over time.
To investigate the effects of a partial shift from SFP to SAP, the SFP were reduced and 
shifted to SAP on a percentage basis, whilst SAP-based ecological payments and LU-based 
payments for animal-friendly housing systems remained steady in order to safeguard the 
Swiss Government’s environmental objectives.
In both scenarios, four versions of allocation of direct payments to SAP and SFP are 
considered. Version 1 is characterised by high SAP in combination with low SFP, Version 
4 by low SAP in combination with high SFP. Versions 2 and 3 lie in between. Figure 3 
shows the average level of the single area payments per hectare for the four versions. Since 
the higher the altitudinal belt, the greater the hardship allowances paid, area payments 
increase from the plain to the mountain region. Relatively speaking, SAP decrease from 
Version 1 to 4 by up to 40% (Figure 4). Viewed in absolute terms, the reduction is around 
CHF 700 per hectare.
















Plain regionHill regionMountain region
Sources: Own calculations.
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The transferability of SFP entitlements to successive agents substantially affects the 
number of exiting agents and growing agents (Figure 5). The number of exiting agents 
increases from 11% (‘Transferable SFP’ scenario) to 17% when SFP entitlements are non-
transferable. Since the number of exiting agents also determines the supply of land put 
up for lease, the number of growing agents also increases, from around 46% to between 
51 and 59%. The number of non-growing agents decreases from between 44 and 40% 
(‘Transferable SFP) to between 36 and 23% (‘Non-transferable SFP) (Figure 5). The mod-
elling of a plot-by-plot leasing procedure from exiting agents to growing agents ensures 
that one exiting agent’s plots are rented on average by four agents (Figure 5). This closely 
matches leasing patterns in Swiss agriculture (Lauber, 2006). 
Figure 6 shows that the number of exiting agents is disproportionately high in the 
‘smallest farm size’ category (< 10 ha) for both scenarios, whilst the number of non-grow-
ing agents is over-represented in this category. By contrast, the number of growing agents 
is disproportionately high in the ‘middle farm size’ categories, and is decreasing in the 
‘largest farm size’ category. This means that the ‘middle farm size’ categories experience 
the highest economic gain from leasing land, whilst in the ‘smallest’ and ‘largest’ catego-
ries the economic benefit is lower, due to limited production capacities. 
The percentage of agents taking over their predecessor’s farm is also higher in ‘larger 
farm size’ categories (Fig. 7). 
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Figure 5. Share of growing, non-growing and exiting agents in the transferable and non-transferable 
SFP scenarios.
44% 43% 42% 40% 36% 32% 26% 23%
46% 47% 48% 49% 51% 54%
58% 59%
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Transferability of SFP from the exiting agents to their successor agents yields an 
average farm-exit rate of around 1.5% in the period under consideration (Figure 8). This 
more or less corresponds to the farm-exit rate observed in Switzerland from 2000 to 
2010. A gradual reduction in SAP (Direct-payment versions D1-D4) does not affect the 
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Figure 7. Percentage of exiting agents and agents taking over farm from predecessors in different 
farm-size categories (D1).
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agents’ exit rate if the SFP are completely transferable (cf. Figure 8). By contrast, in the 
‘non-transferable SFP’ scenario, successors receive no SFP. This causes a corresponding 
drop in their income, which in turn brings about a rise in the exit rate from version 1 to 
4 (Figure 8). 
Figures 9 and 10 show the effects of transferable SFP entitlements on the lease pric-
es of recently leased arable and grassland plots. Both figures give the average values of 
the last three forecast years as a percentage of the lease prices of the base years 2006-
2008. Figure 9 shows that the lease prices for arable land in the ‘transferable SFP’ sce-
nario change only slightly. Only if the SAP are reduced by up to CHF 700 per ha (version 
4) do the lease prices fall by around 7%. This clearly demonstrates that with a relatively 
moderate farm-exit rate of 1.5%, a shift from SAP to SFP has only a limited influence on 
lease prices. If, on the other hand, the supply of leased land increases – as in the ‘non-
transferable SFP’ scenario – a somewhat sharper fall in lease prices for all recently leased 
arable plots of up to 12% on average is to be expected. Lease prices for grassland, espe-
cially in the mountain region, are falling by up to 30% (Figure 10). Accelerated structural 
change and an increase in the supply of land are the main causes of significantly lower 
lease prices. 
Figure 9. Lease prices for arable land (plain region): Average value of all newly leased plots in the last 
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4. Discussion and conclusion 
The agent population of the sector model is based on the 3,400 FADN farms. Geo-
graphically, the 3,400 FADN farms are spread throughout Switzerland. Because, however, 
a spatially realistic local structure is necessary for simulating land trade among agents, a 
spatial reference on the municipal scale was implemented in the sector model. The geo-ref-
erenced local data describe the location of all farmyards and their cultivated plots of land, 
with the actual plot sizes as well as the distance and altitude differences between the farm-
yard and plots constituting the underlying data for the simulation of the land market in 
SWISSland. In this respect, the sector model differs fundamentally from other agent-based 
models that divide the space into raster cells of equal size (Balmann, 2000; Happe, 2004; 
Lobianco and Esposti, 2010; Van der Straeten et al., 2010). In total 59 municipalities were 
introduced in SWISSland in order to model neighbourly relationships among the FADN-
based agents. These municipalities were derived from seven duplicated genuine reference 
municipalities. Neighbouring-agent type, number of plots per agent, and plot sizes – all of 
which influence the leasing decisions of the agents and their changes in farm size – are 
determined by the models’ spatial references, as defined by the selected reference munici-
palities. Model validations with further reference municipalities are therefore necessary in 
order to estimate the impact of the selected reference municipalities on the model results. 
Figure 10. Lease prices for grassland (mountain region): Average value of all newly leased plots in the 
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For the modelling of structural change in agent-based models farm-takeover criteria 
specified by numerical constraints are necessary (Lauber, 2006). Although driving forces 
of structural change are known for Switzerland from Rossier et al. (2006) specified con-
straints are not available. For that reason an exogenously determined minimum household 
income for farm exits was introduced in the model. This assumption influences the num-
ber of exiting farms and their farms size distribution substantially. For that reason further 
studies on driving forces of farm-takeover decisions are necessary. 
The modelling of the land market with the agent-based sector model SWISSland simu-
lates the plot-by-plot leasing of land to the surrounding neighbour agents that is custom-
ary in Switzerland. The bidding process is restricted to eight neighbour agents within the 
same reference municipality. Based on the findings of Strohm (1998), it was assumed that 
only five nearest neighbours were involved in the bidding process. Only in the event that no 
agent could be found were three further neighbours considered. According to Berger (2001) 
it was also assumed that plots which could not find a tenant are reoffered in subsequent 
years on the land market. The lease price is modelled iteratively, with the current lease price 
being assumed as an upper limit. If there is no tenant for this value, the lease price is low-
ered incrementally. All these model assumptions ensure that plots finding no tenant farmer 
and becoming fallow land are not overestimated by the model (Lauber, 2006). 
The allocation of plots to agents is performed according to purely economic criteria – 
not always the case in real-life scenarios in Switzerland, where leasing decisions are often 
made based on personal relationships (Lauber, 2006; Strohm, 1998). This leads to an over-
estimation of economic driving forces of land allocation processes and results in the eco-
nomic advantage of leasing and farm growth being overestimated rather than underesti-
mated. On the other hand the modelling of the plot-by-plot leasing of land to neighbour-
ing agents is common practice in Switzerland. In addition the modelling of real plot sizes, 
and the differences in distance and altitude between the farmyard and the plots enables 
the simulation of farm-size distributions changing fairly smoothly in the context of struc-
tural change as the results show.
The results show that SFP which are tradable to farm successors increase the pace of 
structural change by very little, and have only a slight effect on lease prices. As long as 
a delayed structural change of the current order of magnitude of about 1.5% per annum 
prevails in Switzerland, only minimal effects on lease prices are to be expected, especial-
ly for arable land. It is only for grassland in the mountain region that a fairly intensive 
shift to single farm payments causes a significant reduction in the lease prices. Moreover, 
calculations confirm that intensification of structural change through non-tradable SFP 
would lead to a significant reduction in lease prices, meaning that non-tradable SFP enti-
tlements would be an effective policy instrument for enhancing land mobility and struc-
tural change. The results of this normative study confirm the findings of previous studies.
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